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Kierkegaard's media critic*
EGUCHI Satoshi
                                 Abstract 
 As we see, Kierkegaard was in the first generation of self-conscious and reflective mass media users 
and critics. In fact Kierkegaard's youth saw the rise of popular journalism, and people energetically 
discussed about freedom of press. Shortly later he saw the prosperity and rage of yellow journalism, 
and suffered from the infamous "Corsair Affair". I think his second reflection on society and media 
changed the direction of his conception of the ethical. 
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1 Young Kierkegaard's attitude toward 
  mass media
It is said that Kierkegaard first appeared before au-
dience in 1835, when he was 22 year old, at the stu-
dent club in his university. His lecture was titled 
"Our journalistic literature". This lecture was 
aimed to give a counterargument o the preceding 
lecture presented by J. A. Osterman, who was in 
favor of free-speech. (EPW 189  ff.)1 Osterman's 
points were as follows: even thought popular 
newspapers at that time were often being vulgar 
and harsh, (1) they would promote intellectual abili-
ty of the general populace by making them interest-
ed in reading, (2) they can be spokesmen of those 
who have little  political/economic power, (3) they 
could point out mistakes of governments and the es-
tablishment, and (4) they would make people more 
forthcoming and frank by letting them know what 
others really are, so that, though they may cause 
some harm, on the whole, freedom of speech pro-
moted larger social good. I find his lecture very 
well done when we pay due regard to the fact that 
it was made almost 30 years before J. S. Mill's On 
Liberty. 
 Kierkegaard's lecture was aimed from first to last 
to attack Osterman's expression and logic in detail. 
His point was (1) journalism was run by a few 
talented persons and many incompetent ones, (2) 
journalism, in reality, had little part in Denmark's 
liberalization movement in those days, but, in fact, 
the king Frederic IV had been a leading character, 
(3) to import foreign ideas into Denmark would only 
be a leap and would impede gradual development
 This is a slightly revised version of the paper presented at International Kierkegaard Conference, Kathorike Uniiver-
siteit Leuven, October 13, 2001. 
1The sigla used for citing the works of  Soren Kierkegaard in the text and notes
, are as follows: 
EPW: Early Polemical Writings, trans. Julia Watkin, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 COR: The Corsair Affair and Articles Related to the Writings, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, Prince-
ton Univ. Press, 1982) 
 E0:  Either/Or, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. 
FT: Fear and Trembling, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983 
TA: Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age: A Literary Review, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
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that should be desired, and (4) anonymity of 
newspaper articles would make people irresponsible 
and spoil the correctness of information. 
 Osterman had admired Kierkegaard's intellectual 
ability, but he had an insight hat Kierkegaard "had 
only slight interest in the matter". (EPW 201) To 
me, ignoring Kierkegaard's lecture was somewhat 
verbose and crabbed in contrast to Osterman's 
clear-cut one was understandable. While Oster-
man's argument paid enough attention to middle 
and long-term utility of free speech, I have an im-
pression that young Kierkegaard's view was one-
sided, and of short-range. If Osterman had had the 
"desire to engage with an opponent"
, he would be 
able to reply to him successfully. While Osterman's 
lecture re-appeared in a newspaper  Vwdelandet, it
is not sure that Kierkegaard's lecture had a strong 
impression on the audience. I think we may have 
to say he lost. In successive years he also chal-
lenged other major characters of free speech move-
ment, esp. Orla Lehman and Johannes Hage. As 
far as I read the materials (EPW), Kierkegaard 
didn't achieve a great success. 
 What should we learn from these earliest activi-
ties of Kierkegaard? I would like to recall that in 
this stage he might be only an ordinary young man 
(at least to his fellow people's eye), who had some 
ambition for literary success. It is not impossible 
that he wanted to show off his literary talent and 
ability. 
 In fact, his opponent Johannes Hage ironically 
wrote: 
   Anyone knowing the editor of  Kjobenhaven-
   sposten will be unable to deny him zeal in 
   gathering materials, industry in working 
   them up, a high degree of discretion and 
   deep respect for truth without petty, egotis-
   tic motivation — qualities that we for our 
   part place high above wit and dialectical 
   skill when these are not matchedby a love 
   of truth but serve only to glorify one'sown 
  little self. (EPW 144)
 We can see young Kierkegaard in fact had these 
tendencies from his method of arguments. He 
seemed not to try to put forth some substantial af-
firmation, but only explode his opponents' asser-
tions. 
 It is possible, however, that he placed his hope 
for developing mass media from these polemics. 
The main targets of his attack was consistently am-
biguous conceptions and rhetoric of his opponents, 
and irresponsible attitude of anonymous writers. 
His attack to mass media and its supporters was 
not wholesale. 
   ... here  [Fdrelandet] we have a happiest 
   situation. After withstanding the storm 
   over the David trial,  F~delandet got on its 
   feet with rejuvenated energy and especially 
   of late has achieved a vigorous and sound 
   existence.  Fdelandet seems to have 
   found the direction in which it wants to 
   move and in a frank and honest editor a 
   hand that will prevent every kind of eccen-
   tricity. It seems to have understood that 
   myth ... about the battle of freedom of the 
   press in this country, from which one 
   learns among other things to investigate 
   more closely what freedom of the press 
   there is before sounding the alarm. (EPW 
  52) 
 While Kierkegaard kept his eye on vulgarity and 
irresponsibility of anonymous articles in news-
papers, he admitted that newspapers were useful 
for enlightening people, and kept trying to contrib-
ute not a few articles to newspapers. Young Kier-
kegaard seemed to believe in enlightenment and 
gradual development of their society, though in a 
very conservative way. 
2 The Corsair Affair and Two ages 
Later Kierkegaard found himself and his way to be 
a philosophical author, and left this field of debate 
on free speech. From many of his journal entries,
however, he must have been watching and reflecting 
on the press. After finishing Postscript, as you 
know, he reopened the fight with the vulgar press, 
though this time the opponent was much more low-
brow, harsh, relentless, and malicious. Kierkegaard 
got his honor to be one of the earliest victims of 
yellow journalism. I think I do not need to go into 
the detail here, but only suggest that I think the 
war with the Corsair was started by Kierkegaard 
himself (not P. L.  Moller) and it was due to Kier-
kegaard's misunderstanding of  Moller's article. 
 In any way, this incident made him reflect on his 
society and mass media again. In one of the earli-
est passages of "The Present Age" in TA, which 
was written in the period, he sonorously declares 
that "[T] he present age is essentially a sensible, 
reflecting age, devoid of passion, flaring up in  su-
perficial, short-lived enthusiasm and prudentially 
relaxing in indolence. (TA 68) According to Kier-
kegaard, we are in a age of reflection, and its sick-
ness and symptoms are leveling, disinterestedness, 
anonymity, chattering, superficiality, formlessness, 
philandering, dependence on how-to-manuals and 
negligence of true knowledge. I shall not go far 
into the detail here, thought it is extremely im-
portant, as all of you must know all of his points 
much better than I (I'm sure some of you can even 
recite them). 
 But here I will try to point one easily overlooked 
point. I would like to put forth a hypothesis that at 
this stage of his lifetime, Kierkegaard began really 
to appreciate the ethically positive value of silence. 
He was one of the earliest writers that became 
aware of the importance of inner life, in a sense 
contrasted to public life. 
3 Abandoning the ethics as the disclosed 
Before the Corsair affair, Kierkegaard in  E  0 and 
FT regarded the essence of the ethics as the 
manifest, the open to other people and public. For 
example, in  E  0 Judge William, the spokesman of 
the ethical, says:
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   ... honesty, frankness, openness, under-
   standing — this is the life principle in mar-
   riage. Without this understanding,mar-
   riage is unbeautiful and actually immoral ... 
  (EO II, 116) 
 And in FT, Johannes de silentio declare that 
  The ethical as such is the universal;as the 
  universal it is in turn the disclosed. The 
   single individual, qualified as immediate, 
   sensate, and psychical, is the hidden. Thus 
  his ethical task is to work himself out of his 
  hiddenness and to become disclosed in the 
  universal. (FT 82) 
 In light of these definitions, the aesthete A is 
supposed to remain in aesthetic sphere because he 
 kept his inwardness entirely secret to everyone, and 
Abraham is supposed to be ethically guilty to have 
 2oncealed his intention to sacrifice his son from his 
 ['may. 
 But cannot we really have secrets or inner life, 
 which we may be shy of or hesitate to speak of to 
 ethers, in order to be ethical? 
 For some of our eyes, Judge William may seem 
 to be only a shallow worldling, and no doubt A ap-
parently seems a more attractive figure. 
 It is because Agamemnon in FT tried to hide his 
 attention from Iphigeneia and he himself suffered 
 From it, that he looks a fascinating tragic hero.  If 
 we see a person who can talk about her anything to 
 Anyone, we would regard her not as a ethical per-
son, but as really a shallow being. Not only can we 
see too frank a person as a separate individual, but 
 also we ourselves may not be able to see ourselves 
 AS ourselves if we have no secrecy or isolation. 
 No need to say, Kierkegaard himself had been 
 noticed that secrecy and silence are essential for 
 cur life. Johannes de silentio says: 
   Despite the rigorousness with which ethics 
   demands disclosure, it cannot simply be de-
   nied that secrecy and silence make a man
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great simply because they are qualifica-
tions of inwardness. (FT 88)
 But, in the early works of Kierkegaard, silence is 
dangerous and may be immoral.
The tragic hero, who is the favorite of 
ethics, is the purely human; him I can un-
derstand, and all his undertakings are out 
in the open. If I go further, I always run 
up against the paradox, the divine and the 
demonic, for silence is both. Silence is the 
demon's trap, and the more that is si-
lenced, the more terrible the demon, ut si-
lence is also divinity's mutual understand-
ing with the single individual. (Ibid.)
 We have to choose either to be hidden and silent 
and remain in the aesthetical sphere, or to be dis-
closed and go into the ethical sphere, though it is 
suggested that there may be the third hidden 
sphere, that is the religious. 
 This contraposition between the importance of 
one's own secret/inwardness and the ethical as the 
disclosed, forms the unique tension that marks 
Kierkegaard's earlier works. 
 The problem for Kierkegaard was, that in some 
special situations, we cannot communicate our rea-
sons for actions to other people, or if we do, we may 
not be understood. Take an example from FT.
Abraham remains silent — but he cannot 
speak. Therein lies the distress and anxie-
ty. Even though I go on talking night and 
day without interruption, if I cannot make 
myself understood when I speak, then I 
am not speaking. This is the case with 
Abraham. He can say everything, but one 
thing he cannot say, and if he cannot say 
that — that is, say it in such a way that 
the other understands it — then he is not 
speaking. (FT 113)
But I think it is a bit hard for us to take this in-
sistence at face value. Abraham was in fact required 
to kill his son, and as a knight of faith, he was will-
ing to do it. He overrode a general duty to protect 
his child with God's particular command. In this, in 
one sense, I find no logical problems, as Johannes 
alludes. Indeed, even if Abraham had told his in-
tention to his people, he would never have been un-
derstood. People would have seen him as some-
what tempted or corrupted by a demon, or of a evil 
character. But it is because God's direct command 
rarely occurs and that God requires people to 
sacrifice one's son is really hard to belive. But this 
is a practical difficulty and not a logical one. If, as 
Johannes suggests, Abraham cannot communicate 
to other people because his situation is "particular", 
not universal, we cannot understand the whole story 
or Johannes' speculation itself. Then, if Abraham 
cannot speak, it is because he cannot explain his 
situation practically, not theoretically or logically. 
At least, another knight of faith can understand 
Abraham's situation and would want to admit he 
was right. 
 If one believes his action or decision is ethically 
justified, he must somehow be able to explain rea-
sons to do it. This is the logic of justification, 
which most of us will accept. However, it is hard to 
see even in a very special situation like Abraham's, 
one cannot be justified only because one cannot in 
practice tell his reason to others. Suppose Aga-
memnon had not told of his will to sacrifice his 
daughter because of some practical difficulty, for ex-
ample, because of lack of time. It would not make 
his decision wrong or unjustified. He would have 
said, "I might be misunderstood, and, in practice, 
some surely will blame me, but after deliberation, I 
believe I ought to do it, and I will be justified in the 
most important sense." If so, from my point of 
view, we have to say that the analysis Johannes 
gives us misses the point of ethical justification. 
 His later works such as Christian Discourses or 
SD, however, I think the concept of the ethical as 
open to public seems almost abandoned. Rather, 
the characteristic of the ethico-religious is seen as 
incognito and its imitation, which other people have
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nothing to say about. From this point of view, it is 
one's dissonance of inwardness and outwardness 
that show where he is in several spiritual stages, 
and the depth of one's despair (and one's dialectical 
nearness/remoteness to salvation). Far from disap-
proving silence and isolation as immoral, they are 
positively (though in his dialectical way) valued. 
First, take some passage from TA. 
   ... Only the person who can remain essen-
   tially silent can speak essentially, can act 
   essentially. Silence is inwardness. (TA 97) 
   The law manifest in poetic production is 
   identical, on a smaller scale, with the law 
   for the life of every person in social inter-
   course and education. ... An author cer-
   tainly must have his private personality 
   (sin private Personlighed) as everyone else 
   has, but this must be his adyton [inner 
 sanctum], and just as the entrance to a 
   house is barred by stationing two soldiers 
   with crossed bayonets, so by meansof the 
   dialectical cross of qualitative opposites the 
   equality of ideality forms the barrier that 
   prevents all  access.  ... The inward orienta-
   tion of silence is the condition for cultured 
   conversation ... (TA 98-9) 
 I think it is obvious that here and other similar 
passages in later works Kierkegaard changed his 
conception of the status of silence. No longer did 
he hesitate to admit the importance of silence, and 
had felt no tension between the inwardness and the 
ethical. 
 Now we can imagine why his change happened. 
If the ethical of early Kierkegaard is the disclosed 
in practice to public, and if, after the Corsair affair, 
he came to see the public as corrupted and untruth, 
he had to throw away either the ethical as disclosed
or the inwardness. Of course this second reflection 
on media and society made him abandon the ethical 
as disclosed in favor of inwardness. We are rather 
required to keep our inwardness and ourselves from 
the chattering "public" in order to be authentic ethi-
cal agents.
4 Toward a critical appraisal of Kierke-
  gaard's media critic
Now We have to re-appraise his earlier concept of 
the ethical from our contemporary view. But ap-
parently "the ethical" in EO and/or FT is too 
demanding and might overlook the point of private 
life. I would like to suggest that his difficulty rises 
from the too simple dichotomy of openness/disclo-
sure (private/public). 
 Let me introduce how 20th century philosophers 
threw lights on the issue in haste. As communica-
tion media get popular, the problems of communica-
tion media and privacy became, and has been, one 
of the hottest subjects of contemporary philosophy. 
Many philosopher have had to reflect seriously on 
media why privacy is important. 
 Legal philosophers like Stanley Benn2, Jeffrey 
Reiman and others suggest that we need private in-
ner life for our autonomy. For us to be a autono-
mous person, we have to be able to plan our own 
lifestyle freely for ourselves, and try it ourselves. 
Because we in turn need our inner freedom. In 
short, we need our somewhat closed and opaque in-
ner life in order to be ourselves. I think this line of 
arguments, that hidden inwardness has the greatest 
importance for us, has a strong affinity with Kier-
kegaardian thinking. Rather, we should say they 
are strongly influenced by Kierkegaard and other 
existentialistic philosophers. Now we are sons and 
daughters of Kierkegardian existentialism tradition, 
and he must always be one of the best resources of 
our discussion in this field.
 2  Stanley I. Benn, "Privacy, freedom, and respect for persons", 1971, and Jeffrey Reiman, "Privacy, intimacy, and person-
hood", 1976. Both are reprinted in Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, 
Cambridge University Press, 1984
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 Besides this type of arguments, there's another 
way. In his seminal essay titled "Privacy", Legal 
philosopher Charles  Frieda argued that we have to 
have privacy to have relationships of intimacy and 
trust. If we want special intimate relationship with 
particular people, we must create domains of priva-
cy. James Rachels4 also has argued that people 
need to control information about themselves in ord-
er to maintain a diversity of relationship. For them 
one's inner life and secrets are far from immoral, 
but necessary means for us to have intimate and 
various relationship with others. There are no 
secret/disclosure dichotomy in our daily (also 
spiritual) life, but how we exchange our inner feel-
ings, emotions and thight depends on how we and 
other people have what relationship. I think it is 
this point of view that earlier Kierkegaard could not 
reach at in his own struggling life and authorship.
 Kierkegaard's criticism of mass society and mass 
media has not lost its impact. His theory of in-
wardness has been one of the main resources of our 
self-understanding in our age. I dare to say with-
out further discussion that our important concepts 
of "individual", "inwardness" or "privacy" as we now 
understand them emerged in  mid-19th century 
bourgeois culture. Like J. S. Mill, Edgar Allan Poe, 
and Gustave Flaubert, Kierkegaard himself lived in 
and reflected on mass society, and made an arche-
type of our self-understanding. One field of his 
greatest impact on general readers may be in this 
field, and maybe it is greater than that in Christian-
ity. No doubt we can learn much more from his 
works about communication and media since we al-
ready share his insight about the modern age but 
are in our —maybe a much more reflective, passion-
less, superficial, and always chattering— IT age.
 3  Charles Fried , 
 4  James Rachels ,
"Privacy"
, 1968, reprinted in Philosophical Dimensions  of Privacy: An Anthology 
"Why privacy is important"
, 1975, reprinted in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology
